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Abstract: Bloom’s book underscores the importance of specifying the role
of words and grammar in cognition. We propose that the cognitive power
of language lies in the lexicon rather than grammar. We suggest ways in
which studies involving children and patients with aphasia can provide in-
sights into the basis of abstract cognition in the domain of number and
mathematics.
Writing in the tradition of Brown (1973) and Macnamara (1982),
Bloom provides a thorough review of research on how children
learn the meanings of words. The rich texture of his book testifies
to the diversity and depth of research in this area, and its implica-
tions for our understanding of how the mind of the young child
works. Bloom claims that there is no mechanism that is uniquely
dedicated to children’s word acquisition, but that it is built on abil-
ities that exist for other purposes such as theory of mind. He pro-
ceeds to address the impact of words and concepts in domains
such as numerical reasoning, and draws upon the evidence from
a range of conditions such as aphasia and deafness to examine the
interplay between language and cognition. In this commentary,
we examine the issues of words, grammar, and concepts and how
they might reconfigure the human mind.
In the cognitive sciences, there are increasingly frequent claims
that certain forms of reasoning can only be performed though ac-
cess to the resources of the language faculty. In the recent re-
search of Spelke and her colleagues, a link between language and
cognition (e.g., in the form of numerical and spatial reasoning) has
been demonstrated. For example, the ability to combine sources
of visuo-spatial information has been reported to depend on lan-
guage (Hermer-Vasquez et al. 1999). Moreover, exact arithmetic
addition calculations have been shown to be associated with a lan-
guage representational format, whereas estimations of magnitude
are language independent (Dehaene et al. 1999).
However, there remains a critical need to establish the relative
contributions of the components of language – the grammar and
the lexicon – to cognitive operations. Some take the view that
grammar is crucial in many sophisticated cognitive capacities such
as theory of mind reasoning (e.g., Carruthers 1996; de Villiers &
de Villiers 2000), whereas others maintain it is the lexicon – the
pairing of concepts with linguistic forms – that configures some
aspects of human cognition. Bloom describes two competing
claims in the domain of numerical cognition: that of Chomsky
(1988), who maintains that grammar provides a rule-based blue-
print for the potentially recursive combination of individual units
with potentially infinite outputs, and the alternative claim that
number words create the potential to develop a mathematical fac-
ulty that extends beyond the numerical capacity apparent in pre-
verbal infants and some non-human species (Sulkowski & Hauser
2001; Wynn 1998).
Evidence from aphasia provides important insights on the role of
language in cognition, although the evidence is limited to the role
of language in a mature cognitive system rather than in the initial
configuring of the system. The relation of grammar to cognition can
be determined from the performances of people with severe agram-
matic aphasia on behavioural tasks, while the role of lexical knowl-
edge can be established through cases of global aphasia where the
system of word forms and meanings is itself profoundly impaired.
Studies on theory of mind and causal reasoning in severe agram-
matic aphasia have shown that the cognitive power of language lies
not in the grammar (Varley 2002; Varley & Siegal 2000; Varley et al.
2001) as reasoning is retained in such instances. These studies
prompt a shift in the language and thought debate from the relation
of thought to an undifferentiated language faculty, to the more spe-
cific relation of the role of the lexicon in thinking.
Bloom sets out an agenda for future investigation of the nu-
merical and mathematical abilities of people with aphasia. The
challenge is to demonstrate, first, the extent to which the number
faculty is retained in the absence of grammar, much as is the case
for theory of mind and causal reasoning, and, second, to deter-
mine whether patients with number word processing problems
are capable of dealing with numerical problems beyond the abil-
ity to estimate and discriminate small numbers that lie within the
capacity of preverbal infants. Bloom’s hypothesis of number words
creating a capacity for mathematics is strictly developmental, with
progression from small numerosities, to the acquisition of number
words, leading in turn to increased mathematical understanding.
In this respect, number concepts once acquired can be mapped
to different surface symbolic representations. They can take the
form of number words or other forms of numerical notation (such
as Arabic or Roman numerals). In the established system, having
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acquired numerical symbols, the language scaffolding (i.e., the
number words) may be removed – as occurs in cases of aphasia –
but the capacity for reasoning may be retained in the form of
numerals that sustain calculation. A similar situation might be
observed in the case of a dissociation in the domain of music be-
tween the ability to name a note and to understand its symbolic
musical value (Luria et al. 1965). Just as Bloom concludes that
people without words are capable of rich mental lives because of
non-linguistic conceptual structures, so might already established
number concepts sustain mathematical reasoning despite im-
pairment of surface word forms.
Bloom’s survey rightly emphasizes the role of language in the
acquisition of abstract concepts such as numbers. While many ob-
ject and artifact names correspond to things with vivid perceptual
features, others are abstract and have little existence outside of
the language faculty. “Bees” differ from “beliefs,” and “dogs” from
“democracy.” The investigation of numbers and other abstract
concepts in aphasia may provide a window on the role of word
forms and concepts in cognition, and the sustainability of such
concepts without the associated language form. Bloom shifts the
language and thought debate from grammar to the lexicon, but
also provides elegant illustrations of how grammatical structure
provides one ingredient among the cues that support word learn-
ing and related conceptual development. However, once estab-
lished, the role of grammar as a facilitator of cognition may di-
minish or “switch off.” In our view, it is the facility to construct and
manipulate surface symbolic representations such as words and
numerals that characterizes the huge adaptive advantage of hu-
man cognition and cultural transmission. An issue that cries out
for investigation is to determine whether the loss of such repre-
sentational systems in global aphasia necessarily accompanies im-
pairment in numerical reasoning.
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